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1. The Council of Europe requested the CRID to prepare a preliminary report 
identifying the main privacy issues related to cloud computing and the questions to be 
addressed in the future, in particular in the light of Council of Europe data protection 
standards. 
 
As set by the contract, the work is to identify and underline the main cloud computing 
privacy issues. This first draft is definitively to be further elaborated and to be 
completed. It does not aim at giving answers which would have to be elaborated in the 
context of another mandate. 
 
2. This report is structured as follows. It starts with a brief technical introduction 
illustrating the variety of services covered by the concept of “Cloud computing”. As 
defined by NIST1, “cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and 
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”  
 
3. Cloud computing services include a large diversity of services going from those 
offered at the benefit of individuals as the services offered by social networks to those 
proposed at the benefit of companies in sharing a common software or by using shared 
information infrastructures. To establish a typology of cloud computing services is quite 
important since legal problems raised by each kind of computer services might be 
different to a certain extent. The second point is dedicated to the analysis of the 
adequacy of the CoE Convention 108 (referred hereinafter as ETS 108) definitions with 
the cloud computing reality. In particular, the status of the actors involved into the 
operations will be analyzed. Thereinafter, our report analyses the duties of the persons 
subscribing to the cloud computing services or offering these services. The crucial 
question of the security is then addressed. Finally, the report envisages the delicate 
questions of transborder data flows and international private law, which are inherent to 
most of the cloud computing services.  
 
Obviously cloud computing raises several issues at many levels. Currently, cloud 
computing seems closer to fog than cloud and it might constitute a real danger for the 
users and data subjects whoever they are (legal entities, individuals). 
 
1.1 Some technical aspects and specific risks linked with cloud 
computing services 
 
1.1.1 The frame (or quick history) 
 
4. “In the world of the computers, there are two classes of people”. The first and 
main class is made of the users. All internet surfers are part of this class. The second 
class is made of the professionals of the computer world.  
 
Users exploit applications with a lot of functionalities which help them in their work or in 
their other activities. They reasonably expect that their data be stored in protected 
spaces in order to retrieve these data when needed. That constitutes the standard way. 
 
5. Since the beginning of the computers area and regularly, new concepts appear. 
                                               
1 P. Meil and T.Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15, 10-07-09, available on NIST 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology) web site.  




But some constants remain and it is useful to remember us these fundamental 
concepts. 
 
In the sixties, the only way to do that was to use mainframes for the software. The data 
were stored on tapes, with no direct access for users. 
 
Everything was “online”. The users did not know where and which specific support their 
data were on. They only knew that the data were in one splendid and large room in one 
specific building. Everybody has already seen these ranks of tape machines on TV.  
 
The data access was controlled by the operators of the mainframe. And no external 
access was possible. 
 
Rapidly, an external access was created with a modem and controlled (for the rare 
persons that could try to it) by one simple password. 
 
With the advent of the personal computer, everyone could have programs and data on 
his own computer. Users became responsible for the access control to their data.  
 
Nowadays, with Internet, users can access the data owned by one computer 
everywhere in the world. Users become responsible for the physical protection of the 
data they get to others. 
 
6. Thus, simple users can access data on “mainframes” located anywhere. They can 
also access the data they manage on their own system (that is to say their local 
network). Finally, they can access data stored in computers from where they have 
access when connecting themselves on Internet.  
 
In these 3 cases, users can access to applications on the “mainframe”, on their own 
computers or on other ones elsewhere on Internet. 
 
In conclusion, four main components are needed in computing field: 
 
 Hardware (processing, storage and memory) 




7. These objects of computer science can be used on a local computer (such as the 
user’s personal computer) or on another one located anywhere else while users access 
to it by any means like Internet. The use of external Information systems might bring 
certain advantages since it implies the possibility for your computer or information 
systems to get rid of running programs or to support itself large communications 
facilities. Another benefit might be found in the fact that all the expenses and efforts 
concerning the maintenance, upgrades and security of the information system shared 
between the cloud computing services are supported financially by their different users 
and technically by the company offering the cloud computing services. Definitively it 
might be asserted that cloud computing services do represent for companies particularly 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) major scale economics. At that point it 
should be underlined that this kind of benefit might be also offered in the context of a 
GRID. The main difference between the GRID and the Cloud computing services lays 
down mainly in the difference of nature of the relationships between the users. 
GRID services concern users linked by a common professional interest and using the 
same information system (for instance, hospitals using the same datacenter or peculiar 




software in order to diminish their expenses). In the case of Cloud computing services, 
it is not a question of sharing on equal footing the use of the same services on the basis 
of an individual agreement but rather the selling by certain specialized (or not) 
companies of certain remote services, that we could describe as a commodity which 
presents the following characteristics described by the NIST paper:  
 
 “On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally provision computing 
capabilities, such as server time and network storage, as needed automatically 
without requiring human interaction with each service’s provider.  
 
 Broad network access. Capabilities are available over the network and accessed 
through standard mechanisms that promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick 
client platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs). 
 
 Resource pooling. The provider’s computing resources are pooled to serve multiple 
consumers using a multi-tenant model, with different physical and virtual 
resources dynamically assigned and reassigned according to consumer demand. 
There is a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has no 
control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources but may be 
able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or 
datacenter). Examples of resources include storage, processing, memory, network 
bandwidth, and virtual machines. 
 
 Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically provisioned, in some 
cases automatically, to quickly scale out and rapidly released to quickly scale in. 
To the consumer, the capabilities available for provisioning often appear to be 
unlimited and can be purchased in any quantity at any time. 
 
 Measured Service. Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use 
by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the 
type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). 
Resource usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported providing 
transparency for both the provider and consumer of the utilized service.” 
 
This commodity can be offered through different deployment models. So, NIST paper 
already quoted distinguishes: 
  
 “Private cloud. The cloud infrastructure is operated solely for an organization. It 
may be managed by the organization or a third party and may exist on premise or 
off premise. 
 
 Community cloud. The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and 
supports a specific community that has shared concerns (e.g., mission, security 
requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It may be managed by the 
organizations or a third party and may exist on premise or off premise. 
 
 Public cloud. The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or a 
large industry group and is owned by an organization selling cloud services. 
 
 Hybrid cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more clouds 
(private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are bound 
together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and 
application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load-balancing between clouds).” 
 




1.1.2 Cloud computing 
 
8. With cloud computing, the model implies that there is a simple computer that 
runs one browser. Although simple, this model is sufficient to work. 
 
Users can use one application of the “cloud” and stock their data in one folder in the 
cloud. The most important question is the identification process of access to these data.  
 
The three situations of infrastructure described above in the frame, are translated in the 
model of cloud computing by three models of development. The three platforms are the 
“software as a service”, the “platform as a service” and the “infrastructure as a service”. 
 
The “software as a service" (SaaS) is easy to understand: users access to applications 
on the Web, for example, a text writer, a spreadsheet or more used one email software 
(see http://gmail.google.com). The services offered by Google are part of this kind of 
service. The data are also stored on their servers. Google is technically responsible for 
the application services and for the data of the users (secure conservation and secure 
access). 
 
The "platform as a service" (PaaS) offers an operating system where users can install 
their own applications. However, the data are stored according to the “applications’ 
decisions”.2 
 
The "infrastructure as a service" (IaaS) offers one "logical hardware" infrastructure. 
Users have to install one operating system; the applications they need and can finally 
decide where to store data3. 
 
At high level, these three services are carried out through two kinds of elements in the 
cloud: datacenters and clusters.  
 
The datacenters are specialized hardware where data are stored. They generally provide 
security for access and recovery services. 
 
The clusters offer the execution of programs with a high level of speed.  
 
For simple cases, customers can use simple infrastructures. We can consider, for 
example, that virtual servers are also examples of IaaS. The virtual computer you 
installed can be moved from one location to one another when needed. The case of a 
Web server is current. 
 
In this simple case, we can understand that the segmentation of the infrastructure must 
be serious, because, if not, one instance ca read or write in one other instance or virtual 
machine. Hacking or destruction is then possible. 
 
More generally, in the 3 great kind of cloud computing, the same problem can appear.  
 
In the case of the SaaS, only data are separate. Each user starts one instance of one 
unique application (text writer for example). The identification of the user is the only 
way to attribute data to the correct user. The system must be sure and secure at the 
level of identification. 
                                               
2 See https://www.dropbox.com/ for one simple example or http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/azure/default.aspx for one more complex example. 
3 See for example http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/. 





In the two other cases, the problem is more complex, but the aspect of security must 
not be ignored or misestimate.   
 
In conclusion, the technical problem of the cloud computing is only one kind of 
generalization of existing systems. 
 
1.2 Specific risks linked with the cloud computing: 
 
9. This section describes some risks related to or accentuated by the use cloud 
computing services which justify a possible intervention of the C. of E.: such as the 
opacity of their existence and their functioning, the constant mobility as regards the 
location of the processing operated throughout the world, the possible radical 
dependency of the subscriber towards the cloud computing services, etc. 
 
The legal issues may be different whether we deal with services directed to individuals 
or services for companies or public administration. 
 
10. So, as regards services to individuals like those linked with social networks or 
other large public available web 2.0 platforms, we have to  pay attention to the 
following risks: 
 
 The opportunity – for a third party or the cloud computing service provider itself – 
to profile data subjects by crossing several databases/information related to a 
person existing in the structure of the cloud computing itself. This risk is 
increasing when consumers will be invited to use gratuitously cloud computing 
services if they accept to receive one to one targeted advertising. It is quite clear 
that they will be happy to sell their privacy in exchange of this gratuitousness.  
 
 The concept of consent: Beyond the risk already mentioned it might be 
considered that information circulating in a cloud computing system may be linked 
to people who are not aware about that. 
 
 The problem of “ownership”: Consumers once they have released their data in 
the cloud might have difficulties not only to maintain the access to these data (we 
might think for instance to a sort of denial of access in case of non-payment of 
the service) but more fundamentally to recover their full control of the data 
released when they terminate their contractual relationship with the cloud 
computing service provider. According to the general terms of the service, the 
provider could contractually keep the option open to keep the data at stake even 
after such a termination (e.g. social networking sites).     
 
 The lot of the data after death. When the subscriber of a service dies while his or 
her data are circulating/stocked in a cloud computing system, certain questions 
have to be solved: Who is empowered to get access to these data? The heirs of 
the de cujus? The cloud computing provider?  
 
11. As regards now the case of a company as subscriber of cloud computing 
services, additional questions might raise: 
 
 The obvious need to distinguish clearly the concepts of user, subscriber and 
data subject, which each of them refers to clearly different people involved into 
Cloud computing services and subject to different problems. So, the employee 
who is using the information system provided by his or her company might not be 




aware of the recourse made by his or employer, the subscriber, to cloud 
computing services. As regards the data located within the datacenters provided 
by the cloud computing services, some are relating to customers, furnishers and 
so one who are not necessarily aware of this fact. So to what extent can we 
consider that these persons must be aware of the use of cloud computing services 
and is this recourse subject to possibilities of refusal or even of acceptance? Other 
specific questions relate to the distinction between users (employees) and 
subscribers (employers). In case of death of an employee, who will have access to 
the data stored in the datacenter? The death of the user. This is linked with what 
we saw above. May the cloud computing provider erase the identifier and 
password of the user? Is he empowered to do so? In the negative, who has the 
authority to do so? Beyond that question, is that conceivable, to the benefit of the 
employees using the companies' information system, to make a difference 
between private and professional, excluding the former from the use of cloud 
computing services? 
 
 The protection of legal persons and their know-how, industrial secrets, etc. On 
that point, we envisage two different problems. Firstly, the company might locate 
on the cloud servers trade secrets concerning itself or third parties which might be 
compromised by lack of security of the cloud computing service. Secondly, the 
cloud provider might record certain transactional data generated by the use of the 
services offered, which will reveal substantive activities of the company. For 
instance, the storage and analysis of communication of financial data between the 
subscribing company and a bank might reveal risks of bankruptcy. We will 
comeback to these issues (infra n° 12). 
 
 The exclusion or subjection to strict conditions of the use of cloud 
computing services for some types of data or activities (like the activities 
submitted to a professional secrecy). Certain legislations (see the US HIPPA4 on 
Health data) regulate the disclosure of data to third parties. Insofar as the cloud 
provider might be considered a third party, he will be submitted to such 
regulations. In some cases, it could be deemed, due to the sensitive nature of the 
data and the risks inherent to Cloud computing services, that the processing of 
these data is incompatible with the concept of cloud computing which involves the 
dispersion of data and to a certain extent the loss of control by the data controller 
on the data stored within the clouds. Therefore, should the use of cloud 
computing services be banned in some circumstances or for some matters? 
Indeed, one can consider that some matters as health, Justice, administration are 
so sensitive that they cannot be reconcilable with the use of cloud computing 
which could imply the spreading of information on the Internet with a major risk 
of disclosure. 
 
 For the same reasons, should the use of cloud computing be forbidden or subject 
to certain restrictions when specific processing of data by public administration 
or authorities are concerned, since the sovereignty could exclude the transfer of 
data to countries where risks of attempts to the confidentiality or more broadly to 
the security of data might jeopardize the State’s sovereignty? The use of hybrid 
clouds operating only within the national borders might be imposed as a solution.  
 
                                               
4 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. About that example and others, see B. Gellman, Privacy in 
the clouds: Risks to Privacy and confidentiality from Cloud Computing, Report prepared for the World Privacy 
Forum, Feb. 23, 2009.  




2 Personal data flows within any cloud computing 
system 
 
12. Different personal data flows can be identified within any cloud computing 
system which involves several actors. 
 
We can identify four major ones as data controller, data processor, subscriber, user and 
data subject. 
 













3 Thoughts about actors 
 
13. ETS 108 provides basic and useful definitions for the processing of personal 
data. However, this list shall be completed taking into account the peculiarities of cloud 
computing. 
 
Providing additional definitions should clarify the understanding of the functions and 
duties of all the actors intervening in the Cloud computing system. 
 
Therefore, any text dealing with Cloud computing seems to refer to certain concepts 
known or unknown by the existing Convention 108: 
 
 Cloud computing provider: The natural or legal person providing a service 
(SaaS, PaaS and IaaS) in a Cloud computing pattern. 
  
 Subscriber: The natural or legal person contracting with the Cloud computing 
provider. The function and duties of this actor will be explained below. It might be 
an individual (see social networks), a company or a public administration 
 
 User: The natural or legal person actually using, in the context of their tasks, the 
services of the Cloud computing system. It can be the same person than the 
subscriber, as it cannot be. In the latter case, an employee working in a company 
could be involved. He would be the user while the company would be the 
subscriber to the service (SaaS, PaaS and IaaS). Definitively the users might be 
data subjects of the processing operated by the subscriber or by the cloud 
computing provider. ? Should the cloud computing service provider be subjected 
to specific obligations in favor of the user – only acting as a user? And which 
would be such obligations (e.g. information)? 
 
 Data subject: If ETS 108 already deals with the concept of "data subject", it 
doesn't give any complete definition. It appears important to define precisely this 
main actor in the personal data processing, whether in a Cloud computing system 
or not.  
 
 Data processor: The distinction between data controller and data processor is at 
first glance quite clear according to the definition given by Directive 95/46/EC but 
this actor is not defined in the ETS 108. The Data controller processes the data for 
his own purpose and defines the means to achieve his purpose; the data 
processor operates data exclusively at the request of the data controller and does 
not pursue any own purpose. In the context of cloud computing, the provider 
might be considered in certain cases as a data controller and in other cases as a 
data processor. The qualification might be in other cases quite difficult « since the 
cloud computing service provider could define means that, due to the 
characteristics of the service at stake, would justify some processing operations 
not directly requested by the subscriber – as the case may be, data controller ». 
As an example, the provider of an IaaS, caring about the efficiency of its service, 
could automatically allocate processing and stocking capabilities between various 
facilities located worldwide. For instance, at a time “t”, the most efficient could be 
to use a data center and processing capabilities located in Germany. But, due to 
the increasingly use of these facilities at a time “t+1”, it could be more effective 
to have recourse to facilities located elsewhere in the world, for instance in India, 
in providing the service – which could involve a duplication of data, etc. In this 
respect, the technology at stake would automatically imply a transborder data 
flow the controller of whose is not necessarily easy to determine.   From another 




point of view, in a lot of cases, the cloud computing service provider might take 
advantage of storage or processing capacities offered by third parties, who could 
be considered as data processors of data processors.  
 
If we introduce the distinction between data controller and data processor in the context 
of a C. of E. regulatory text it would be absolutely needed to specify the “legal” regime 
of this new actor and the specific duties, firstly, of the data controller who has recourse 
to a data processor (obligation to have a written contract specifying the tasks given to 
the data processor, requirement as regards the quality of the data processor, etc) and, 
secondly, of the data processor (prohibition of personal use of the data processed in the 
context of the tasks operated on behalf of the data controller, etc). 
 
4 Legal issues dealing with domestic use / non 
domestic use 
 
14. The cloud computing is currently serving the domestic and personal framework 
(social networking sites, webmail, online diaries, etc) as well as professional 
environments (legal bodies decentralizing their IT network to reduce costs, etc). 
 
Knowing that European Union has, voluntarily, limited the scope of Directive 95/46 to 
the non domestic processing of personal data, is this limitation relevant in the context of 
cloud computing? This exception is particularly relevant in the context of some Cloud 
computing services (social networking sites, etc). But a practical interpretation thereof 
have to be found which would not deprive data subjects of their rights enshrined in data 
protection legislations, and would not suffocate other individuals by heavy rules. As the 
case may be and depending on the Cloud computing service at stake, it is necessary to 
think about the opportunity of establishing a softer – or not - data protection regime in 
spite of a wide application of an exemption to the scope of the legislation.   
 
This distinction might have harmful consequences for individuals as far as transborder 
data flows are concerned. Indeed and in some national laws, the rules dealing with such 
situations are applicable only to the non domestic use. This means that the data subject 
concerned by a non domestic process enjoys more protection than the others who could 
lack some protection in the context of cloud computing services. How does it to be 
taken into account? In brief, is this distinction desirable in a cloud computing 
environment? 




5 Legal issues dealing with the protection of legal 
persons 
 
15. Another issue rose by the cloud computing relates to the concept of personal 
data. Do we have to confine this concept to the definition given by the ETS 108 which 
says that personal data "means any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual (“data subject”)"?5 
 
In the context of, if need be, a specific regulation targeting cloud computing, wouldn’t it 
be relevant to extend the concept of personal data to any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable legal person? In the surroundings of cloud computing, does the 
concept of personal data have to be extended – and how – to information such as 
industrial secrets, know-how, etc (see above)? 
 
Most countries do not extend data protection scope to legal persons. The cloud 
computing system may change this conception because it will be used by the legal 
persons as a way to reduce their IT costs. And, depending on the relevant market, they 
could be deprived of any bargaining power (e.g. SMEs and non-profit organizations). 
This would compel them to contract under unfavorable conditions to stay competitive, 
having thereof less regards for data protection and privacy.   
 
For the record, the Strasbourg Court has always asserted that article 8 ECHR protects 
not only the individuals but also legal persons notably their industrial secrets, know-
how, etc. Obviously, they want to keep them safe from any disclosure to third party 
without any prior authorization. The concern is to determine to what extent a protection 
should be provided for by the law to legal persons since the use of cloud computing by 
companies or other legal persons create such a technical and economic dependence for 
these companies in regard to the Cloud computing service. The imbalance of 
information powers between individuals and companies or administrations created by 
ICT use has been at the basis of data protection legislations. Perhaps it might be 
meaningful to extend data protection principles to the protection of legal persons when 
it is clear that the same imbalance exists, and, improving in so doing the protection of 
the individual concerned by legal person’s files or databases. Furthermore it should be 
noticed that certain countries, members of the Council of Europe, have already 
extended their data protection legislations to legal persons (see notably partly Italy, 
Luxemburg, Norway).      
 
Therefore, such consideration coming from companies who may be a major user of the 
cloud computing system, mainly on a B to B basis, has to be taken into account. 
 
Using such system, companies will stock confidential information (as the know-how, 
industrial secrets, etc) on apart servers or they will use cloud computing for internal 
communication (email, VOIP, etc). Therefore, they expect a reasonable protection of 
such information. In case of lack of protection, they could be reluctant to use cloud 
computing systems. 
 
16. A better protection of the data related to legal persons may be necessary due 
the concept itself of the cloud computing. Indeed, meta-processing are possible with 
such system because the cloud computing provider may access to information of 
various legal persons. With such crossed data, he may offer service of added value as 
risk analysis on companies, etc to third parties. Such attitude may constitute a major 
risk of disclosure of confidential information to third parties.  
                                               
5 Article 2a. 





17. Taking these concerns into account, we need to determine if the concepts of 
personal data and data subject have to be extended to legal persons as regards cloud 
computing. Arguments might be drawn down from previous extension to legal persons 
as it has been the case under the EU e-Privacy Directive and under certain legislations 
of member states of the Council of Europe (Italy, Norway, Luxemburg, etc). 
 
6 Legal issues dealing with the actors within any 
cloud computing system and their functions 
 
18. Primary issues relate to the concepts of data controller and data processor. As 
has been seen before, the cloud computing system will involve both of them. 
 
The main question is to define who is who and who does what. 
 
For the record, the data controller is the natural or legal person who decides the 
purpose and the means of the processing. It is the cornerstone of the data processing. 
It has the responsibility of the main duties (information, security, etc). The 
determination of the data controller will have a huge impact on the legal structure of the 
cloud computing system. 
 
In the determination of such data controller, we have to take into account the 
extraterritorial characteristic of actors and its consequences. 
 
Indeed, main of the cloud computing actors are set up out of the territory covered by 
Council of Europe's competence. Consequently, the control of their use and policy can 
be difficult for both the authorities and the subscribers as well as for the data subjects. 
 
So, it should be easier for the authorities to control the respect of the duties and to 
punish the possible lack of respect of them if the actor is set up on the European 
territory. 
 
We may view the Cloud computing service provider as a data processor instead of a 
data controller. It should act on behalf of the user (or subscriber) who processes 
personal data. But sometimes, the Cloud computing service provider pursues its own 
purposes for the processing of personal data. And as far as these processing operations 
are concerned, it is a data controller. Two issues result from this assessment. First, 
when a Cloud computing service provider is data controller and data processor as 
regards a same user (or subscriber) could it be deemed appropriate and/or necessary to 
extend its quality of data controller for the whole processing operations? Secondly, if it 
is only a data processor, is it appropriate and/or necessary to establish, as the case 
may be, some specific duties (security, information, etc) and/or a specific rule of 
responsibility (e.g. as what exists as regards the responsibility of the intermediaries at 
the sense of the e-commerce Directive of June 8 2000) falling to the data processor?    
 
19. Therefore, it appears preferable that data controllers be under Council of Europe 
member states’ jurisdiction. The question is also related to the right of protection of the 
users and data subjects. If the main actor is outside the scope of European’s 
competence, how can the data subject or the subscriber or even the authorities control 
and sue him in case of lack of respect of its duties? 
 
Consequently, from the data protection point of view: 
 Is the cloud computing provider data processor acting on behalf of the subscriber 
(data controller)? 





 Is the subscriber a data processor towards the data controller (mainly outside 
Europe)? 
 






















Data processor  
 
Is that possible for subscribers to require by contract with the cloud computing service 
that the data generated or operated by the cloud computing services will be located in 
the territories of the Member states and to forbid any onward transfers…? What about 
the possibility for users to take benefit of this provision? A third party beneficiary 
provision ought to be included in cloud computing standard contract.  
 
It has to be pointed out that in practice, both models could, in some extent and in a 
same relationship between the cloud computing service provider and its subscriber, 
overlap. Depending on the processing at stake, the provider could be data controller 




and data processor at once with regard to the same data or to the same data subjects. 
In this respect, it has to be determined if the subscriber – following a basic view, that is 
to say the data controller – could be a co-controller as regards these processing the 
controller of which is the provider – following the same basic view, that is to say the 
data processor. To this end, raises the following fundamental question: what is the 
definition of the concept of “co-controllers” and does it have to be adapted in the 
context of the cloud computing? This is of course crucial due to the aforementioned 
scattered location of the actors of the cloud. 
 
The following simple examples can illustrate the pertinence of the purpose. An employer 
decides to have recourse to encoding software offered by the cloud (SaaS) and 
designed to encode invoices from employees who seek refund for fees supported by 
them. The SaaS provider could offer its subscriber (employer) an additional – of course 
not free – service to monitor the expenses realized by his employees. The service could 
consist of the sending of monthly reports detailing in descending order the total 
amounts of expenses per employee. In such a case, could – and should – the purpose of 
the processing – monitoring of employees in a specific field –, being a complementary 
service, be deemed to be defined by the subscriber and the provider at once? Another 
example comes from the social networking sites context. The provider of such a 
network could offer a personalized advertisement service consisting of a SaaS enabling 
a company to choose a specific audience to deliver advertisements, without such 
company processing any personal data, the provider of the SaaS holding alone this 
task. Could – and should – the company ordering the advertising campaign be deemed 
to be a co-controller of the processing at stake? In both cases, the providers of SaaS 
define means for the processing of personal data and suggest to subscribers a purpose 
they assigned to the means they created, purpose the subscriber chooses to 
appropriate, bearing processing of personal data. Is it opportune to define – or redefine 
– a “co-responsibility” of the actors in such cases, and how could and should it be done?     
 
7 Legal issues dealing with the duties of the actors 
 
20. Transparency towards the users and data subjects should be a fundamental 
objective of any cloud computing system. This objective involves the obligations of 
information definitively with regards to the users but also perhaps with regards more 
generally all the data subjects. 
 
Subscribers resorting to a cloud computing services should be under strict obligations of 
information to final users, when users are different from the subscriber (for instance in 
case of the relationships between an employer and an employee). It is not obvious that 
the consent of the users has to be obtained by the subscriber but definitively it seems 
that they have to be informed. When a person is giving his or her data to a data 
controller using cloud computing services as data processor, is the information about 
the recourse to this data processor needed, considering the specific risks linked with the 
activities of this data processor?  I do not want necessarily to send my data or 
information on me to a third party which is not the direct contractor, especially if I have 
no certainty about the final place of the processing.  
 
21. This obligation of information is directly linked to the article 5a which sets 
that the "personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be obtained and 
processed fairly and lawfully". The term "fairly" involves this concept of information. As 
the cloud computing involves necessarily data processors, the several users or 
subcontractors should be informed about this situation. Otherwise, the processing will 
be unfair because of the lack of information towards people using the system. 
 




22. Therefore, should article 5a terms be reviewed in order to fit the specific 
transparency issues raised in any cloud computing system? But, how far the data 
subject has to be informed of the particular technology at stake and its technical 
implications, such as the relocation of the storage of information in another State, the 
chain of sub-processors, and, as the case may be, its legal implications such as the 
occurring of processing operations in a non Contracting States where even adequate – 
but different – data protection rules merits mention?  
 
Who has this duty? Cloud computing provider or subscriber? The determination of the 
function of each actor will be decisive. 
 




23. First of all, we have to make a distinction between two levels of security. The 
first one will deal with the connection between the user and the cloud computing 
provider and the second one will be the cloud computing system itself. 
 








Cloud computing system Secured connection
 
By making this distinction, we consider the data computing system as a kind of safety 
deposit box which can be accessible only by authorized person. On the other side, the 
access to this safety deposit box must be secured to avoid any access to the transferred 
data by unauthorized persons.  
 
But, there is a damper to this. Indeed, we have to take into account that too much 
security kills performance. That means that we'll have to do the balance between 
absolute security and performance of the system. 
 
24. The article 7 imposes “appropriate security measures”. It does not define 
who has to support this that obligation. It might be the data controller, the data 
processor or even the sub processor (provided that these two last actors are not defined 
by the ETS 108). The concept of ‘security’ is quite broad, even if not defined precisely 




by the article 7 of the Convention 108. It means under article 17(1) of the Data 
Protection Directive protection ‘against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental 
loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing 
involves the transmission of data over a network, and against all other forms of 
unlawful processing’. So, for example, the risk of wiretapping by unauthorized third 
parties during the use of the services requires appropriate safeguards like the use of 
cryptography or secured lines (e.g. in case of electronic transmission of the credit card 
number). The possibility of intrusion within the provider’s information system in order to 
collect all its customers’ addresses or to manipulate certain data imposes the necessity 
to install firewalls and other security measures. The sending of worms through the 
information systems of a communications service provider or the creation of a mirror 
site in order to lead astray certain communication are other specific risks linked with the 
use of communications services. The obligation is not limited to technical measures but 
encompasses also organizational measures which might be the nomination of a data 
security manager competent to ensure the compliance of the functioning of the service 
with all Data protection requirements. 
 
25. Security is essential in case of cloud computing services since it is quite clear 
that by trusting a cloud computing service, the subscriber aims at being protected 
against all risks linked not only with confidentiality (disclosure or intrusion) but also with 
integrity and availability of the data stored somewhere in the cloud. In other words, 
since the cloud computing service provider is offering services founded on the security 
in the broadest sense, it seems meaningful to impose them additional obligations as 
regards this obligation to security and more particularly in case of what is called: 
“security breach”.   
 
8.2 Specific obligations of security.  
 
26. Regarding security and integrity of cloud computing services, according to the 
peculiar risks raised by such services due to the concentration of applications and or 
data used by different users and subscribers and the huge possibility for unauthorized 
people of aggregating all these data, it might be wise to impose new obligations to their 
providers. Amongst these appropriate security measures, three ones could be taken into 
consideration: The first one addresses the problem of unauthorized access by the 
provider’s employees: providers of cloud computing services could be subject to an 
obligation to develop measures like systems of identity management in order to fix and 
control effectively the respective privilege afforded to each member of personnel 
regarding the access to personal data conveyed, stored or operated by the 
communications services. The second one would target the needed protection of these 
data against any loss, destruction or illegal access or storage. It refers to various 
technological security measures so the encryption of transmitted data, the adoption of 
automated control systems about the quality and integrity of stored or transmitted data, 
the setting up of log-in and log-out registries, etc. The last security measures would 
concern the adoption by the provider to express in clear language his security policy. 
This obligation participates to an increasing accountability of the data controllers by 
compelling them to envisage the risks associated with the services they provide, to 
define exactly how they manage these risks and by making them responsible in case of 
non respect of their commitments. Furthermore it might be envisaged that the cloud 
computing services’ provider would be required to cooperate with the competent data 
protection authority(ies) in case they would like to audit the security measures 
promised or implemented by the providers. In the same line, the possibility for these 
authorities or standardization authorities to issue recommendations on best security 
practices ought to be assessed. 
 




27. Some other organizational measures may be adopted in the context of the cloud 
computing matter as: 
 
 Obligation to audit the system to put the risks and the lack of securities or 
confidentiality in an obvious place; 
 
 Obligation to segregate the data stored by each subscriber in order to avoid any 
accidental or unlawful access to these data by another subscriber; 
 
 Obligation to have a person responsible for the security who will be in charge to 
warrant the security of the cloud computing system for the provider; 
 
 Standardization/normalization of the sector to give to the user/subscriber a kind 
of security in its choice. This standardization/normalization goes hand in hand 
with the delivery of quality-labels available for cloud computing providers who 
insure the respect of several conditions/obligations of quality.  
 
28. The bankruptcy or transfer of the cloud computing activities might cause 
certain problems. The cloud provider’s bankruptcy might lead to the sale of the cloud 
computing services to a company exercising competing activities with the subscriber’s 
ones or having another privacy policy. The bankruptcy might in other cases lead to the 
termination of the activities. Anyway, the subscriber must be aware of the 
consequences of the disappearance or transfer of the cloud computing services on the 
data which are stored or put into circulation by it. So different questions would have to 
be analyzed. Do we have to provide the continuity of the contract with its confidentiality 
or security guarantees, etc? Is that possible for the subscriber to unilaterally terminate 
the agreement for privacy or competition reasons and, if it is the case, to be sure to get 
back his or her data? 
 
Cloud computing business model and architecture calls for a deeper examination of the 
relevance of non regulatory instruments. Indeed, cloud computing companies are 
mostly international and implemented in a great number of countries. Advantages and 
disadvantages of self-regulatory instruments, such as the European Union model of 
Binding Corporate Rules, whether as an alternative or complement to the existing legal 
framework, need to be assessed.  Due to the globalized nature of cloud computing 
companies, we strongly believe that European Union’s experience with BCR could 
provide an interesting framework and point of departure for future debates. 
 
8.3 Obligations in case of “security breach” 
 
29. The concept of security breach is unknown by the C. of E. regulatory text but 
has been introduced recently in European Union by the Amending Directive on e-
privacy. This Directive defines "personal data breach" as a breach of security leading to 
the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or 
access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed in connection with 
the provision of a publicly available electronic communications service in the 
Community. The main idea is to put on the shoulders of certain communication services 
providers’ new obligations provided that specific risks are linked with the nature of their 
services.  
 
As regards, European Union Directive, the targeted services are limited to publicly 
available electronic communication services even if it has been recognized that in the 
future the concept must be extended to other services due to the risks existing in other 
services like banking on line services or electronic healthcare online services. Clearly the 




debate around the revision has asserted the need to re-open the debate about this 
limited scope and to follow the US example (see at the Federal level, the "Data 
Accountability and Trust Act", by extending certain obligations to any person engaged in 
interstate trade and who own or possesses electronic personal data shall notify a breach 
to individuals, if the breach leads to an unauthorized third person acquiring the data, 
and also to the Federal Trade Commission. So the first question is: “To what extent the 
specific nature of the risks linked with cloud computing services might justify the 
extension to these services?”.  Perhaps the U.S. extension or the extension to all Cloud 
computing services is too broad since they will conduct to minimize the obligations to 
impose but considering the nature of the risks offered by cloud computing services 
acting or not as data controller and offering not a specific services like a service 
assisting people in order to fix meetings (like Doodle) but services including more 
sensitive processing, what remains to be defined. The main criterion must be the 
importance of risks incurred by the subscriber of the service but more generally by the 
concerned people.  
 
30. The second question, having solved positively the first one, envisages the 
different obligations linked with the “Security Breach” regime.  It consists of two kinds 
of additional obligations:  
 
 First all the legislation imposes a duty to inform through appropriate means the 
data subject, what might in case of cloud computing services go far beyond both 
the subscriber or the users and implies in cases of cloud computing offering purely 
technical or software facilities without having an access to the data themselves a 
partition of the tasks between the service provider and the subscriber and that in 
order to afford them an opportunity to take the needed measures to avoiding or 
reducing the risk. As regards the list of the beneficiaries of this obligation, can we 
consider, on the basis of the previous remarks, that in certain cases this obligation 
to notify must be extended at the benefit not only of individuals but also of legal 
persons?  
 
 Second point, do we impose an obligation to alert at the same time the data 
protection authority? But in case of positive answer: which one (due to the global 
character of the provider)?  Which information must be given?  and through which 
channel? 
 
 Finally we pinpoint the idea for standardization authorities of establishing in close 
connection with these independent agencies technical and security means. 
 




9 Legal issues dealing with liability 
 
31. As we deal with several actors working together, we necessarily have to raise 
the issue related to the liability of each one. 
 
It goes hand to hand with the function of each of them in the system. If the ETS 108 
gives duties to the data controller (controller of the file), there is nothing concerning the 
data processor for the simple reason that it is not considered by the Convention6. As 
has been seen before, the data processor is one of the main actors in a cloud computing 
system and it might be useful – and this has to be assessed – to impose on such data 
processors – or, as the case may be, on some data processors – specific duties by "law" 
instead of contract. Such specific duties could consist of security obligations, information 
obligations, a specific liability (e.g. as what exists as regards the responsibility of the 
intermediaries at the sense of the e-commerce Directive 200/31/EC). As stated above, a 
particular liability could be established as regards co-controllers. But it also have to be 
further assessed. Each time it is considered opportune to create new duties, the 
question of liability has of course to be studied.   
 
32. The liability will be at several levels. The cloud computing provider (as data 
controller) will have to ensure a total security of its infrastructure and of the 
transmission of data from the users to its service. This duty of security should also be in 
charge of its own data processor(s) (subcontractor(s)). In this last case too, the duty 
can be enforced by law or by contract. The advantage of the law is to be compulsory 
and to give no autonomy to the parties and, therefore, to protect more efficiently the 
users. Indeed, it avoids the possible lack of balance of power between the parties (see 
above) to the detriment of the users. 
 
10 Legal issues dealing with transborder data flows 
 
33. Due to its highly virtualized architecture, cloud computing services involve great 
amount of data transfers, among which personal data as defined in the ETS 108, and by 
thus raise the issue of the applicability of the transborder data flows regime defined in 
the Additional Protocol 181. First, these transfers may occur between several actors: 
personal data may be transferred within the cloud provider’s proprietary cloud, which 
can cover several countries; transfers may occur between cloud providers; transfers 
also occur between the cloud subscriber and his cloud provider, when he benefits from 
the cloud computing services wherever his location, such as when accessing, consulting 
or downloading personal data. Second, these transfers between actors may pursue 
different purposes: some transfers might be justified for purposes of transit or technical 
maintenance, while others are directly justified by the necessity to provide the cloud 
computing services requested by the user.   
 
All these transfers may involve transborder data flows, since the cloud providers may 
resort to processing materials located in several countries to offer its services to 
subscribers/users soliciting cloud services from anyplace. Circulation of information, and 
as far as we are concerned, of personal data within and outside the cloud may occur in 
non State Parties to the ETS 108, among which most do not provide adequate level of 
protection. This state of fact raises the following issue. 
 
                                               
6 However, we can take the concept of data processor out of the article 7. 




10.1 Applicability of the existing legal framework of additional 
protocol 181 
 
34. The applicability of the existing legal framework to cloud computing technology 
requires deeper attention and assessment. Article 2 of additional protocol 181 basically 
prohibits international transfers of personal data toward states not party to the ETS 108 
that would not ensure adequate level of protection. Any actor involved in cloud 
computing services, whether user, subscriber or cloud provider, should be fully aware of 
this prohibition and the legal risks associated with international transfers that would not 
satisfy to the TBDF regime.  
 
35. Derogations to this general prohibition as provided in additional protocol 181 
need further examination. As provided in article 2 a), national laws may allow transfers 
of personal data toward non-adequate destinations in case of “specific interests of the 
data subject” or when legitimate interests, especially important public interests prevail. 
Rightly applied, these exemptions could constitute a basis for several international 
transfers in the cloud computing context. As a first instance, the data subject’s consent 
to the transfers at stake could be solicited. As a second instance, international transfers 
could be justified by the necessity of the performance of the contract concluded in the 
interest of the data subject between the cloud provider and the cloud 
subscriber/controller. Public authorities resorting to cloud computing services in the 
framework of their tasks could justify international transfers in the name of legitimate 
important interests.  
 
As far as the second set of exemptions is concerned, article 2, b) offers possibilities of 
international transfers “if safeguards, which can in particular result from contractual 
clauses, are provided by the controller responsible for the transfer and are found 
adequate by the competent authorities according to domestic law.” Appropriate 
contractual clauses might constitute a relevant framework to ensure the legality of 
international transfers. However, such framework needs further assessment about its 
relevance in the cloud computing context, due to the necessity to take fully into account 
that the flows generated by the Cloud computing services often are concerning a lot of 
countries and a lot of companies as previously asserted. Perhaps the use of ‘Binding 
Corporate rules’ adopted by large multinational companies offering cloud computing 
services can be at least a partial solution.   
 
36. In general, the applicability of these two sets of derogations to the cloud 
computing context needs further assessment from the point of view of the level of data 
protection aimed at by the Council of Europe. In the context of unbalanced relationship 
between a cloud provider and its subscribers that could either be individuals or legal 
persons of little/medium influence, raising the data subject’s consent or the necessity to 
perform a contract concluded between the cloud provider and the customer as primaries 
legitimate legal basis for international transfers could reveal wholly unsatisfactory.  
 
10.2 International transfers of personal data/storage of personal 
data and law enforcement objectives 
 
37. One of the most obvious and serious risks for data protection raised in the 
context of cloud computing architecture is a massive access by law enforcement 
authorities to the personal data and information stored in datacenters. Indeed, these 
datacenters can be established in countries that provide little or no protection of 
personal data in the framework of law enforcement activities. The development of 
datacenters might provide great opportunities to public authorities to access to great 




amount of information pertaining to its citizens or to foreign citizens7. Even considering 
democratic countries, the United States of America constitute a problematic example 
due to the very controversy third party data issue in the limited scope of the Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
  
10.3 Limitations to transborder flows and Applicable law 
 
38. As stated above, cloud computing technologies involve countless transborder 
data flows implicating Parties to the ETS 108 and its additional protocol, as much as 
foreign States. A first set of rules is provided for in article 12 of the ETS 108 in 
consideration of transborder data flows between Parties to this Convention – only 
indirectly taking into account transborder data flows intended for non contracting States 
(article 12.3, b)) –, and a second one, provided for in article 2 of the additional 
protocol, directly addresses the issue of transborder data flows intended towards non 
contracting States.  
 
39. The aforementioned sets of rules are targeted to the specific aim of reconciling 
guarantying effective data protection and fundamental rights and liberties – even 
outside national borders – on the one hand, and on the other hand, ensuring the free 
international circulation of information between people, as the case may be, avoiding 
forms of protectionism. In this respect, transborder data flows between Contracting 
States should not be subject to any special controls; the sole purpose of the protection 
of privacy cannot justify the prohibition or the submission to a special authorization of 
these flows of personal data. Therefore, the ETS 108 prohibits what we would call an 
“administrative control” on data flows. However, under article 12.3, a), a Party can 
disregard this rule if it has a specific legislation for certain categories of personal data or 
of automated personal data files, because of the nature of those data or those files, 
except where the legislation of the other Party provide an equivalent protection. So, as 
the case may be, a first question arises: could – and should be, for instance due to the 
characteristics of the service at stake – cloud computing technologies be deemed to 
constitute such a category of « automated personal data file » (e.g. health care online 
services) ? In other words, in the context of cloud computing services, the maneuver let 
by the ETS 108 to the contracting States to adopt a particular regulation as regards 
specific cloud computing services (e.g. concerning sensitive data) has to be assessed. 
As stated above, cloud computing recovers various realities and it could require specific 
rules and particular treatment in some cases and not in others (e.g. depending of the 
public nature of the cloud computing service, etc).  
 
40. As far as the additional protocol and the transborder data flows implying non 
contracting States are concerned, and except the exceptions provided for in article 2.2 
of the additional protocol, article 2.1 of the latter compels contracting States to forbid 
these flows if the concerned non contracting State (or organization) does not ensure an 
adequate level of protection for the intended data transfers. In this respect, the 
assessment of adequacy could be realized on a case by case basis. And again due to the 
diversity of cloud computing services, some distinctions could be drawn by the 
contracting States, and the protection offered by a non contracting State could be 
                                               
7 Except in cases where onion routing is used by cloud computing service. Onion routing is a technique allowing 
anonymous transactions within a computer network. The messages are encrypted repeatedly and sent through 
multiple networks nodes called onion routers. Each node decrypts the message in order to get the routing 
instruction and so encrypts and sends the message to the next onion router till the final destination. 
Intermediary nodes do not know the origin and the final destination of the message. In that case the national 
law enforcement agencies are unable to get access to the information if it is transmitted through onion router to 
a destination outside the national borders. On onion router example, see EFF’sTor: http://www.torproject.org ,     




adequate in one case and not in another; which distinctions can and should/have to be 
drawn?  
 
Two principal remarks can be made. Firstly, the aforementioned rule should be without 
prejudice to an analogical – and a fortiori – interpretation of article 12.3, a) of the ETS 
108 in the present context of data flows targeted to non contracting States. That is to 
say that the Convention should be interpreted in such a way that a contracting State 
can prohibit – or subject to authorization – a transborder flow related to a specific 
“automated personal data files” aforementioned if, for instance, the foreign State 
concerned does not offer an equivalent protection, even though it ensures an adequate 
level of protection.  
 
Secondly and more generally, the additional protocol doesn’t compel the contracting 
States to do anything else if the targeted foreign State offers an adequate level of 
protection; it only forbids to allow transborder data flows targeted to non contracting 
States. In this respect, despite the fact that the protocol also pursues the free flow of 
information, it does not explicitly forbid contracting State to forbid personal data flows 
targeted to a non contracting State offering an adequate protection. So, the question in 
the context of cloud computing is the following: could a contracting State deem that a 
particular processing involved in a cloud computing service require an equivalent 
protection from the non contracting State, even if this particular processing is not 
deemed to constitute a particular “automated personal data files” under article 12.3, b) 
of the ETS 108, or to involve particular data? In other words, contracting States seems 
here to recover a larger margin of maneuver than it was the case under the ETS 108. 
But, on the one hand, how wide could be this maneuver if there is one? And, on the 
other hand, which cloud computing services could and should/has to be specially treated 
through this potential margin?  
 
41. Beyond what we called an “administrative control”, the ETS 108 and its 
additional protocol, although they try to solve – in a certain manner – the issue of 
transborder data flows, don't provide for any rule related to conflicts of law. And this is 
also true as regards personal data flows between contracting States. As far as these 
latter are concerned, the explanatory report  recognizes that “it may not always be easy 
to determine which […] national law applies”, and it underlines that  “the "common 
core" will result in a harmonization of the laws of the Contracting States and hence 
decrease the possibility of conflicts of law or jurisdiction ”. However, neither the 
Convention, nor the additional Protocol addresses this issue. Moreover, the Explanatory 
Report also specifies that the principle of freedom of flow of personal data provided for 
in article 12.2 “does not mean that a Contracting State may not take certain measures 
to keep itself informed of data traffic between its territory and that of another 
Contracting State, for example by means of declarations to be submitted by controllers 
of data files”. In the context of cloud computing, the scattered worldwide locations of 
the actors involved (i.e. cloud computing service providers, subscribers, users and data 
subjects, controllers or processors) exacerbate conflict of laws concerns – that already 
existed – and have to be faced by national legislations; but how can they regulate and 
which constraints limit their margin? 
 
42. The already quoted directive 95/46/EC addresses, in some extent, the question 
of the applicable law, by compelling the Member States to apply their national laws in 
the cases defined in article 4 of this directive. This article marks the spatial boundaries 
of European data protection law. It seems that this rule needs to be implemented as an 
“unilateral conflict of law rule” defining the applicability of the national law at stake 
following the defined criterions. However, despite the fact that the directive also 
provides rules as regards transborder data flows targeted to a non Member State, it 




does not provide for a general “bilateral conflict of laws rule” the Member States could 
be deemed free to adopt. 
 
Contracting States (here, the legislator or the jurisdictions) have to define which law 
apply to which particular processing of personal data. And they have different ways to 
determine the applicable law. They can adopt a bilateral conflict of laws rule 
determining the applicable law in all instance, they can define the criterions of 
applicability of their law (for instance, taking into account the place of establishment of 
the data controller and/or the location of the equipments it uses for the purposes of a 
particular processing, see art. 4 of the directive 95/46/EC) with an unilateral rule, or 
they can also define a particular “public order exception clause”. However that may be, 
cloud computing technologies require a reflection on part of contracting States to the 
Convention on which criteria are the best to cause the applicability of their national data 
protection laws and to fit into the particular issues arising from the above mentioned 
technologies. In this respect, for example, only some rules of data protection could 
receive a particular territorial scope as regards cloud computing services in general or 
even some cloud computing services in particular. For instance, a particular specific 
duty of information and right of access could have a more extended territorial scope if 
some data protection rules are extended to the processors, imposing them specific 
duties or responsibilities – if deemed necessary –, the applicability of these rules could 
depend on specific criteria differing from those applicable to the data controller 
according to already established general data protection rules. Needless to say that 
such a conflict of laws rule would gain in quality – from a practical point of view – if it 
would be discussed at an international level – for instance, under the auspices of the C. 
of E. for instance. It should also be noted that directive 95/46/EC is in process of 
modification. A discussion relating to conflicts of law seems to be of high interest and 
pressing to guarantee the practical enforcement of data subjects’ protection, and to 
bring legal certainty to the emergent and promising market of cloud computing.   
 
43. A final point can be underlined as regards conflict of laws: which – if it can – 
influence would have article 8 ECHR on data protection conflict of laws rules?  Article 1 
ECHR reads as follows: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. In this 
respect, the jurisdictions of these contracting Parties, applying the law of a non-
contracting State of the ECHR, could have to ignore this foreign law if, in the particular 
case, it rises to a conflicting situation with the fundamental rights provided for by the 
ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights has already approached this concern as 
regards article 6 ECHR. Four questions need to be addressed. Firstly, which “rights” 
recognized under article 8 ECHR could influence the application, in a particular case, of 
conflict of laws rules? Secondly, which data protection rules fall within the scope of 
article 8 ECHR and these rights?  For instance, which rules of the “common core” of the 
[ETS] 108”? And finally, which “connections” an international case involving cloud 
computing technologies need to have with the Council of Europe’s members States’ 
territories to require the applicability of these identified rights? It has to be recalled that 
this would happen under the final control of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
44. To sum up, closely regarding the specificities of cloud computing technologies, 
contracting States to the ETS 108 have to determine which applicability of which 
national data protection rule to international cases is desirable and permitted and/or 
required. 




11 Data retention and restriction for some matters 
 
45. At this point of the discussion, we also have to pay attention to the question of 
the extension of certain legal obligations for certain communications services’ providers 
to retain data about the uses of their services or to cooperate with law enforcement 
authorities at their request or even at their own initiative8. That obligation would be 
more or less similar to the obligation imposed by the EU Directive to the IAPs and 
publicly available e-communication services’ operators.  
 
For instance, should Facebook have an obligation to retain some data and to cooperate 




46. The first question raised by the consideration and questions set above is to know 
if a specific regulation on cloud computing is needed.  
 
At this very provisional stage, following considerations can be addressed. It is not 
obvious that, from a Privacy legal point of view, it will be possible to envisage on equal 
footing, even if they have common characteristics, all the cloud computing services. To 
be short: Facebook does not raise the same problems than Azure of Microsoft.  
 
 Anyway, as showed previously, new definitions and concepts like data processor, 
subscriber, ought to be introduced if we want to approach correctly the problems. 
 
According to the specificities of each cloud computing services, different contractual 
models ought to be proposed between subscribers and cloud computing services with 
provisions about responsibilities, law applicable and competent jurisdiction, right to the 
data subjects to take benefit of the contract, etc. 
 
Additionally, it might be interesting to see to what extent certain new obligations might 
be the object of a Council of Europe Recommendation. This Recommendation would 
target both subscribers/user and cloud computing services’ providers. It might concern 
notably the obligation to inform the users and the data subjects about the main 
characteristics of the service and their qualification as data controller or data processor, 
about data breaches, additional obligation to security, etc. 
 
As regards security questions, perhaps provisions about the role of standardization 
authorities and labeling systems would be appropriate; 
 
The idea to have specific Corporate Binding Rules in cases of multinational cloud 
computing services’ providers has to be assessed.   
 
47. At this stage, we isolated questions as regards the Council of Europe Convention 
108 amongst which we have: 
 
 Do we have to specify new actors in the context of cloud computing? 
 
 What is the lot of the data circulating/stored when the user, data subject or 
subscriber dies? What happens with the data put into the cloud if the cloud service 
is transferred to a new operator (fusion, etc)? 
 
                                               
8 See the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention, article 17. 




 Is the differentiation between domestic use/non domestic use pertinent? 
 
 Do we need to extend the protection to the legal person and to change the 
concept of personal data? 
 
 Is it useful to add some definitions which do not exist yet in the ETS 108 and to 
modify some others? 
 
 On the security field, do we need to make special provisions for the cloud 
computing? What’s about the role of standardization bodies? Do we need to 
envisage security breach provisions in that context? 
 
 Do we have to ban or restrict the use of cloud computing services  as regards  
sensitive matters, professions or activities (public or not)? 
 
 How to manage the transborder data flow questions and the applicable law issue? 
 
48. To distil the substance of the present report, it has first and foremost to be 
underlined that cloud computing is a very wide – and not precisely defined – concept 
consisting of lots of different realities. On the one hand, the offered services have 
various natures – e.g. IaaS, PaaS or SaaS, private or public clouds, etc,  – and various 
purposes – domestic, professional, public, etc. And on the other hand, the involved 
actors are also very different – individuals who are consumers or professionals, SMEs, 
NPOs, administrations, worldwide corporations, etc, and numerous imbalances could 
exist between them. Therefore, the questions identified above could receive varying 
answers according to the many facets of cloud computing technologies that will most 
probably continually evolve. In fact, these facets not necessarily raise the same 
concerns as regards data protection. Moreover, in the same sense, these questions 
could also vary according to the particular services and actors at stake, and they could 
not always have the same pertinence.  
 
So there is a preliminary recurrent question: which particular cloud computing 
service is at stake and who is involved? Keeping the specific and multifaceted 
context of cloud computing in mind, the questions we identified – and we do not aspire 
to be exhaustive – can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) Who are the actors of cloud computing? Do they need to be legally defined if 
it is not already the case? If they are already legally defined, do the definitions 
at stake need to be modified? We identified five, sometimes overlapping, categories 
of actors: subscribers, users, data subjects, controllers (co-controllers) and data 
processors. Two principal questions to raise: 
 
 Does the concept of data processor need to be defined under ETS 108? 
 Do legal persons need to be protected under the data protection rules of the ETS 
108, with regard to which data (extension of the definition of the personal data 
and, therefore, of the data subject)?  
 
2) Which existing duties under ETS 108 need to be adapted? Which non-
existing duties under ETS 108 need to be created? As the case may be, which 
actor has to bear these modifications or these creations? More precisely:  
 
 Should data processors have to support specific duties provided for by the law, 
and which duties (e.g. in general as regards transparence and liability)? 




 Should co-controllers to be targeted by specific liability rules and a particular 
allocation of duties under ETS 108? 
 Should a specific duty as regards security breaches be established? Who would 
have to support this new duty (provider and/or subscriber), towards which actor 
(subscriber and/or data subjects) and in which cases? 
 How to treat the distinction between non-domestic and domestic processing 
activities? When is it still relevant and how to improve the protection of data 
subjects when a domestic use exception could apply (total exclusion of data 
protection law or establishment of a softer legal regime)? 
 Should data retention obligations have to be imposed on cloud computing services 
providers, when and how? 
 Due to the possible imbalance between the actors of the cloud, is consent always 
an adequate basis of the legitimacy of the processing at stake or should data 
controllers – and if so when – have a duty to base the legitimacy of their 
processing on an additional basis?   
  
3) How could what call the “data protection continuity” be maintained? This 
question can be subdivided into the following concerns: 
 
 When the cloud computing service provider or its user (data subject) terminates 
the contractual relationship at stake, how can it be guaranteed that the data 
subject (user) will recover the total “ownership” (control) of data relating to him?  
 In cases of bankruptcies, mergers of corporations or sales of corporations, etc, 
how can it be guaranteed that the level of protection originally ensured to the 
data subject will remain at least equivalent? 
 
4) How to face the numerous concerns arising out of the international 
character inherent in cloud computing? This broad question also needs to be sliced 
into parts:  
 
 Do some specific cloud computing services (e.g. involving sensitive data) need to 
be forbidden when they imply transborder data flows between contracting States 
and, a fortiori, non-contracting States ensuring an adequate level of protection?   
 Which concerns can be solved by binding corporate rules? 
 How to assess the adequacy of non-contracting States to ETS 108 as regards the 
processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes? 
 How far could consent and contract authorize transborder data flows outside the 
territories of contracting States, towards non-contracting States not ensuring an 
adequate level of protection? 
 How to resolve conflict of laws when actors involved in the cloud are located 
anywhere in the world and rules on conflict resolution do not yet exist? In other 
words, we should work out rules to solve conflicts of law at least in the context of 
Cloud computing. 
 Does the “territoriality” of data protection rules have to be differently defined 
depending on the duties (e.g. security or transparence) and the actors (data 
controller or data processor) at stake, and if so, how? 
 
____________________________ 
